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#### The aff’s reformation to the political economy can’t be separated from the narrative of neoliberal success. Unspoken, but ever present, is the appeal of the American Dream that entices and assimilates the most privileged Asian populations as junior partners to whiteness. As

Overall, in the pro-Liang mobilization, what might be read as a moment of acculturation, in which the Chinese American subject moves toward American cultural citizenship through civic participation and immersion in racial minority discourse, needs historical and transnational articulations. The American Dream is not just about crafting the American nation-state as an exceptional place upholding democracy and freedom; it is an imperialist ambition. These ideologies indeed travel across national borders as transnational capital moves through geopolitical spaces, demanding an open market and culturally equipped consumers, building a parasitic ideological relation between the two nations. The neoliberal form of the Asian American body politic is fused with the model minority ethics of hard work and deservingness, as well as anti-Blackness, and it treats any political outcry against racialized state violence as a performance of political correctness.**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

#### This parasitic citizenship required by appeals to economic freedom, competition, and the American Dream produces both inter and intramural violence for a taste of conditional freedom. The rampant nationalism spurred by Liang’s shooting of Gurley demonstrates how racial and political crises can be coopted for conservative means

Liu 18 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Complicity and Resistance: Asian American Body Politics in Black Lives Matter,” October 2018, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 21, Number 3)

This racial antagonism between Asian and African American communities, which resulted in accumulated transnational geopolitical conflicts, reached a peak in the aforementioned incident of Liang’s shooting and killing of Gurley in November 2014. This incident, occurring during the height of the BLM protests in Ferguson, became a controversy in the movement. The controversy was raised and then became a division between African and Asian Americans but also within Asian American communities because Liang, a young Chinese American man, was the first among all police officers indicted, the others all white, who had abused police powers in the line of duty resulting in the deaths of many unarmed and innocent Black people. It became apparent to Asian Americans that the government was using Liang as a scapegoat to try to alleviate the national racial “crisis” highlighted by BLM activists and their demands to reform and abolish the police system built on the practices and ideology of white supremacy. This targeting of an inexperienced Asian American officer offended many Chinese Americans. Within a few months of the incident, two large-scale rallies and several press conferences were mobilized in support of Liang by Chinese American business leaders and local politicians, who accused the city’s indictment of officer Liang as racist. This seemingly defensive mobilization against Liang’s indictment was quickly appropriated by conservative elites and politicians and turned into an offensive, anti-Black critique of BLM’s racial justice vision. I identified four distinct discursive strategies that the pro-Liang groups adopted to turn BLM’s critique of the state’s racism via police violence into racism against Chinese Americans: racial victimology, ethnic empowerment and deservingness, the American Dream, and anti-Blackness. These discursive strategies allowed the proLiang groups to shift the attention away from BLM’s broader demand for racial justice and toward intergroup Asian-Black conflicts. Racial Victimology The pro-Liang coalition mobilized Chinese immigrant communities not only in New York City and its surrounding suburbs but also transnationally. An online petition for the White House opposing Liang’s indictment started by a Chinese American community member quickly reached almost 120,000 signatures.27 Within a day of the announcement of the court, tens of thousands of dollars were donated to the campaign to withdraw Liang’s indictment from Chinese people of all classes—restaurant workers, beauticians in hair salons, business managers, lawyers, and retired elders, and so on.28 Meanwhile overseas, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central propaganda newspaper, People’s Daily, not only reported the incident but also condemned the U.S. government as “unjust” and argued that “the US legal system still has a long way to go,”29 implicating that the unequal treatment of Chinese Americans crushed the fantasy of egalitarian multiculturalism in the United States. Due to the wide-scale response and interests in the case, a self-proclaimed “civil rights” organization called Coalition of Asian American for Civil Rights (CAACR) was quickly formed after the incident. The coalition organizers, mostly Chinese American businessmen, saw this as a chance to inject rarely visible Asian American agendas into mainstream politics and strengthen the community’s ties with the police and the state. Thousands of Chinese American protestors gathered on the lawn of Cadman Plaza in Brooklyn, waving American flags and bilingual signs in support of Liang on April 26, 2015. The crowd largely consisted of middle-aged, first-generation Chinese Americans and their young children. Many people wore red clothes as a symbol of Chinese national pride. Although the event was set as a protest against the “unjust treatment” of the state and many were chanting “No Scapegoats!” along with the organizers on the stage, the tone of the event was strangely celebratory. Some families brought picnics and speakers to play Chinese music in the park, as if it was an extension of the Lunar New Year celebration that had happened earlier in the month. Due to the sheer amount of people present in the crowded space, it was difficult to hear the speeches from the politicians and business leaders on the main stage. The political content of the rally was not clear to me in the first place. My conversation with a Chinese woman in her thirties from a New Jersey suburb confirmed at least one segment of ambiguous political motivation of the participants, as she admitted that she wasn’t familiar with the details of the Liang-Gurley case. The reason she had decided to come was because a message in her WeChat group encouraged people to show up to demonstrate “Chinese unity.” The themes of Chinese unity and pride seemed collectively shared among the participants, who expressed a sense of urgency to show up and to “not get looked down on by the Americans,” in other words, the mainstream society that they felt had silenced their political views for too long. The reason that the mobilization was successful and effective should not be attributed to the significance of the Liang-Gurley case alone but be examined in the context of a cumulative organizing effort within Chinese communities. Several precursor events contributed to the turnout at Liang’s rallies. First, in October 2013, on the Jimmy Kimmel Live segment “Kids Table Government Shutdown Show,” ABC aired an episode in which four children were discussing how the United States should solve the problem of its massive national debt to China. One child suggested that the government should build a big wall, and another six-year-old child laughed and said, “kill everyone in China.”30 The remarks infuriated Chinese American communities, a group of whom sent a petition to the White House’s “We the People” online initiative to demand that the U.S. government investigate ABC’s racial hatred.31 It reached a hundred thousand signatures in the three weeks following the show’s airing. Although the White House used the argument of free speech to deflect the demand, a new online network of Chinese Americans was built and carried a sense of political purpose to challenge racism against Chinese communities in the United States and abroad, unaffiliated with the existing nonprofit structure of Asian American network formed after the civil rights movements, galvanizing a new Chinese American collective identity of racial victimhood.32 Second, this insurgent political consciousness of middle-aged Chinese Americans, traditionally thought of as silent in American mainstream politics, was mobilized due to their desire to preserve their children’s educational privileges in higher education, as many institutions now do not consider Asian American a protected racial category. A coalition of Asian American groups filed suits against Harvard and several other Ivy League universities in 2015 and 2016 regarding their racial quotas in admission processes.33 While progressive affirmative action activists have been adapting the category of Asian American to argue that not all Asian Americans fit into the high-achieving stereotype, especially when Pacific Islanders and Southeast Asian Americans are considered, the complaints around higher education admission from Chinese American communities in recent years are primarily based on the ideology of meritocracy regardless of one’s race. This demand is about eliminating the Asian racial category as a protected class that is no longer needed. A color-blind racial rhetoric packaged in discourses of rights and justice has emerged in conservative Chinese American communities. These two political mobilizations together became the background driving forces for a solidified Chinese American subjectivity in the Liang Gurley case, built upon a form of racial victimology. The Chinese protestors, particularly the leadership, called out the state’s scapegoating tactic against Liang and labeled the incident “racial discrimination,” “unfair treatment,” and “selective treatment,” as many white officers have killed innocent people and have not been charged with manslaughter. Signs depicting Martin Luther King and speeches about the killing of Vincent Chin in the 1980s were highlighted in the rallies in March and April 2015, each drawing thousands of Chinese American participants. Ethnic Empowerment and Deservingness Whereas the deaths of Gurley and many other Black victims of police violence were not fairly addressed by the state or mainstream media, many Chinese publications in the United States portrayed the Chinese American mobilization in a unilateral celebratory tone. World Journal and Sing Tao Daily called the pro-Liang movement, which started in New York and spread across major U.S. cities, a “historical” phenomenon and the “largest” Chinese American gathering in the United States, showing an “unprecedented unity” and “solidarity” as well as a “mature and rational” image of the community.34 The Asian American rhetoric from the civil rights movement was largely appropriated to manufacture a united front of the Chinese American body politic as racial victim and, again, a legible racial minority deserving of institutional access and apology. This celebratory narrative of the newly emerged Chinese American “political unity” quickly became a political opportunity for Chinese elites to form a “rainbow coalition” with local Republican politicians, Asian and white, seizing the moment to condemn the current Democratic government and form stronger ties with the city’s police department. For instance, Joseph Concannon, a white retired NYPD captain, failed Senate and city council candidate, and president of the Tea Party–aligned Queens Village Republican Club, was a major force behind the pro-Liang rallies. Concannon, along with other Chinese American Republicans including Phil Grim and Doug Lee as well as qiaoling (僑領), overseas Chinese business leaders, worked together to push for their antipolice reform agendas as means to not only undermine the government of the more liberal-leaning mayor Bill de Blasio but also unite Asian American voters for the upcoming local elections, as voter registration forms passed through the rally crowd. In the March 9, 2015, “Support Your Local Police” rally to protest the indictment of Liang, Concannon implicitly condemned BLM activists as “racial arsonists” and “professional agitators” who were “turned loose” under de Blasio’s leadership.35 He and other Republican politicians addressed the Chinese American community as the “natural ally” for the pro-police and conservative agendas. A right-wing alliance developed between conservative Chinese and white Americans, who share a deep investment in preserving class privileges and status, in the name of “racial justice.” Far from being cross-racial solidarity, this alliance is white assimilation in disguise. Although securing Asian American voter blocks seemed to be the rainbow coalition’s primary motive in participating in the pro-Liang rally, for many of the Chinese American participants, it was a rare opportunity to express pride in their long-overlooked ethnic and national identity. This intensified sentiment of Chinese nationalism became salient to me in the rally on April 26. Whereas the coalition leadership was drawing from a more multicultural, pan-Asian discourse to put forth their demands to drop Liang’s charges, the conversations I had with the participants emphasized that Chinese people should stand up for themselves and not to get “harassed” or “put down by the Americans” anymore—meaning not only the white Americans who occupy a superior position in society but also other racial minorities, particular Blacks, whose demands seem to be taken more seriously by the state. The Liang incident becomes another classic example of how Asian Americanness is lifted up to perpetuate model minority success in order to deny the institutional access of other marginalized racial subjects such as in the affirmative action debate. It is ironic that the coalition leadership monopolized the representation of “Asian Americans” as a way to reappropriate the current racial crisis for ethnic-nationalist concerns, as the coalition was composed of only Chinese American and white leaders. The discourse of Asian racial victimology was mostly present in the official rhetoric of the Chinese American leaders, but to the participants, especially for the first-generation immigrants, it was more of an issue about Chineseness. Their urgency to stand up and join the rally was to express political power as a people to the American public after decades of being silenced as a racialized population. The American Dream The discourses of the American Dream were everywhere in the pro-Liang rallies. Chinese American families waved American flags while marching across the Brooklyn Bridge on April 26, 2015. The American anthem played before the speeches. Interestingly, the participants, who were largely native Chinese speakers, seemed uninterested in the American anthem, and hardly anyone sang along. Most of the participants, Chinese families with young children, gathered in small groups to take pictures with the American flags given to them by the coalition leaders. Any pedestrian who just happened to walk by that day would have had difficulty recognizing this gathering as a “political protest,” as many participants treated the event more like a social celebration. Some participants were waving heart-shaped signs with the Chinese letter “love” (愛) in red along with the American flags. A thick, impenetrable, and totalizing force of Chinese nationalism was forged during the event. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment superseded the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. At one point the redness of the American flags and the redness from the participants’ signs, clothes, and banners, which symbolized Chinese unity, merged in the scene. It became clearer and clearer to me, as I marched “ethnographically” with the crowd, that the American Dream was aligned with an equally powerful, affective Chinese Dream and a neoliberal transnational dream of class advancement that requires exclusion and stratification of the classed and racial Other. As a queer Taiwanese American observer in the march, my otherness was indeed quite apparent. Despite being ethnically Han, my queerness and nonconforming gender expressions drastically singled me out from the crowd of middle-aged parents and their young children. When I spoke to the march participants, my Taiwanese Mandarin accent was also quite distinct from that of the Chinese mainlanders. I felt as though I was a “race traitor” and consciously distanced myself from the crowd so that they would not recognize my ulterior emotions. At the same time, I recognized the very flexible capacity of my Asian Americanness that blended in the collective expression of Chinese American body politic to the non-Chinese spectators, yet my queerness continued to signify a stance of dissidence and protest—an opposition to the American and the Chinese ideal. However, without the presence of other dissidents, my race and ethnicity were quickly absorbed and territorialized by the collective body politic in the event—the ambiguous yet powerful signs of Chineseness, masking in total consensus by the bodies, the chants, the redness everywhere on participants’ signs, banners, and clothes. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment supersedes the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. The U.S. flag in the event symbolized not only allegiance to the state but an aspiration to become successful as Chinese people in the United States. During my fieldwork on the bridge, another middle-aged Chinese woman told me that she had brought her son to the rally because she wanted him to “learn democracy” in order to be “successful in this country.” As much of the Chinese press that covered the pro-Liang mobilization as a historical event has shown Chinese solidarity and Chinese people’s capacity to participate in civic actions in a “mature and rational” manner,36 the subjectivity that emerged in these events was less about a demonstration of American patriotism and more about Chinese modernity and desire for a new nation as a people. As the previous Asian American assimilationist politics in the post–civil rights period emphasized American national and cultural identity, that is, a liberal racial ideology of national belonging, the pro-Liang coalition expressed a qualitatively different kind of national belonging grounded in a moral and cultural ethic of economic advancement and civic respectability, as well as in a dream of Chinese modernity. Aihwa Ong has defined neoliberalism as a technology of governance that rearticulates the social criteria for citizenship for the purpose of optimizing the effects of the market and demoralizing economic activities.37 Citizenship is thus no longer strictly attached to national identification but defined by economic productivity. In short, the participants’ desire for U.S. nationalism is less about being seen as “Americans” and more about a longing for continual economic prosperity and political opportunities for their communities and their next generations. Similarly, the discourse around Liang’s “unfair” indictment focused not on his unequal treatment as an “American” but on how the promise of model minority advancement was temporarily shattered by a state-inflicted racial crisis.

#### Asian Americans are at a political crossroad. Historically apathetic, the new waves of Anti-Asian violence have created new waves of political hope and energy for Asian communities. BUT that political hope is not neutral – central to the appeal to assimilation is also the appeal to reinforce the systems of militarism and violence that have torn our communities apart. From Asian Americans donating nearly $100,000 to the Proud Boys after the capital riots[[2]](#footnote-2) to supporting affirmative action lawsuits,[[3]](#footnote-3) the chase for the “good Asian American Life” AND the fear of being the perpetual foreigner constitutes a wounded attachment that demands permanent hierarchies.

#### Retrofitting one’s subjecthood around economic competitiveness and proving economic value creates this nationalistic identification in hopes of assimilation. However, “Assimilation must not be mistaken for power, because once you have acquired power, you are exposed, and your model minority qualifications that helped you in the past can be used against you, since you are no longer invisible”[[4]](#footnote-4)

-Cathy Park Hong: Minor Feelings

Ironside 11 (Emily Rae Ironside, MA in Communication, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,

(Re)Constituting the Immigrant Body through Policy: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Narratives within the Discourses of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication, <https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=etd&httpsredir=1&referer=>)

Using exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilationism to reframe marginalized immigrants as Americans rather than enemies of the state creates a rhetorical tension through which DREAM Act supporters must cautiously navigate. Although the familiar theme of assimilation creates ethos and closes the gaps privileging “Americans” over immigrant “Others,” it also reifies their own their subordination by preserving the dominance of exclusionary nationalism. Feminist scholar Audre Lorde speaks to marginalized black feminists attempting to eradicate racism within White feminist discourse, arguing that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”312 Lorde’s warning applies to all subordinated groups who use dominant, elitist discourse to bring about genuine social change. She argues its very usage reinforces “the master’s” position of power and prevents social transformation; therefore, subordinated immigrants who wish to challenge their position of powerlessness and encourage longterm social change should understand the rhetorical consequences of reenacting the discourses of exclusionary nationalism. Using assimilationist discourses to persuade policymakers to expand the definition of American to include immigrant “Others” ultimately fails to destroy the institutionalized dominance of the exclusive national narrative responsible for their exclusion. In order to challenge the state’s control over the American identity, undocumented immigrants and their allies must master the art of difference and redefine themselves outside of the dominant exclusionary nationalist discourses. In addition to employing exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilation to persuade policymakers to pass the DREAM Act, the panelists speaking in the 2007 hearing upheld the classist rhetoric of economic competition, constructing themselves as valuable assets to the American economy. They took on the myth of American exceptionalism as their own, claiming that they are the key to maintaining the economic power of the United States as global competition increases. Although this rhetorical strategy challenges the notion that undocumented immigrants are potential terrorists, it ultimately constitutes them as economic pawns of the state, further reducing the possibility for long-term social change that liberates undocumented immigrants from their marginalized position. The following section investigates how class-driven testimonies reinforce the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism and perpetuate the economic subordination of undocumented immigrants. “We Are the American Dream”: The Conundrum of Classist Discourses The panelists speaking in support of the DREAM Act in the 2007 hearing strategically used classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism to construct undocumented immigrant youth as economic necessities. Historically, the notion of economic competition has been used to label unwanted immigrants as competitors who threaten the financial security of the nation and, therefore, endanger the livelihood of its citizens. Immigration policies such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the mass deportation of Mexican laborers in the 1930’s, and the seizure of property of interned Japanese in the 1940’s all were the result of widespread fears unwanted immigrants were stealing American jobs and threatening the national economy. In the case of the 2007 hearing on the DREAM Act, supporters utilized classist discourses of economic competition by constructing undocumented immigrant youth as valuable assets whose skills and determination will improve the economy, labeling those who deny legal access to these young workers are the new economic threat. Unfortunately, this rhetorical strategy did nothing to challenge exclusionary nationalism and, as a result, perpetuated the reduction of immigrants as laborers serving the state’s economic interests. Classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism constructed undocumented youth as a necessary investment in the nation’s economy. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, a panelist representing the Center for Employment Policy, stated of undocumented students, They are hardworking and talented, and produce streams of income taxes and Social Security payments that bolster our fiscal position. . . . This total of about 1 million potential workers represents .7 percent, less than 1 percent of our labor force . . . even though these undocumented young people are a small group, they have the potential to make an important contribution to our economy. . . . This makes the educational investment worth it both for the students, but more importantly for the rest of us. . . . because we have more productive citizens who fill needed job openings and who can pay taxes. . . . the United States needs these young workers.313 Contrary to the dominant classist discourses blaming the immigrant “invasion” for “[displacing] Americans from jobs” and “[placing]” heavy burdens” on the economy, Furchtgott-Roth constituted immigrant youth as outstanding entrepreneurs who will fill needed job openings and contribute to the strength of the American economy.314 Additionally, Furchtgott-Roth used statistics from a 2005 Harvard University study to argue that immigrants actually help raise average American wages by 0.1%, demonstrating how increasing access to employment for immigrants would not have the negative impact suggested by opponents of the DREAM Act. Although Furchtgott-Roth’s testimony challenged the conventional rhetoric that frames immigrant laborers as economic threats, it reinforced the classist construction of immigrants as token laborers needed for the economic prosperity of the White nation. Moreover, her “expert” testimony delegitimized the witnesses testifying before her. Rhetoricians Lorraine Higgins and Lisa Brush argue that marginalized “Others” “rarely constitute a public perceived as capable or ‘expert’ enough to contribute anything valuable to public debate.”315 By inviting “expert” witnesses representing the “master’s language” to speak after the immigrant “Others,” policymakers reduced the rhetorical power of the immigrant women and their personal narratives. Supporters of the DREAM Act perpetuated the myth of American exceptionalism, thereby maintaining the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism. The “expert” panelists in the 2007 hearing reinforced classist discourses when they portrayed immigrant youth as contributors to the myth of American exceptionalism. For example, Mr. Jamie Merisotis of the Institute for Higher Education Policy commented, If you consider what our national workforce needs are in the specific sense of human capital, it is clear we are looking at an enormous shortage of educated workers in the not-too-distant future. . . . Investing in those who are already here is our best hope for remaining competitive on a global scale. . . . The DREAM Act is a common-sense piece of bipartisan legislation that provides these talented and industrious future workers a pathway to citizenship.316 Additionally, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) argued, Our Nation is faced with ever increasing economic competition from developed and developing nations. To effectively compete in an ever expanding global market, we must ensure that we can continue to have the most educated workforce in the world. Whether in college or in the military, we must give all qualified young people the opportunity to contribute in ways that will keep America strong.317 Both Merisotis and Lofgren drew on the myth of maintaining American exceptionalism to support the passage of the DREAM Act. They legitimated the rhetorical constructs connecting economic status to national strength, claiming the key to keeping “America strong” is to invest in undocumented immigrant youth. By doing so, they objectified immigrants as being “human capital” only needed for the economic benefit of the state. Additionally, Merisotis and Lofgren preserved the notion that uneducated immigrants remain a danger to society when they suggested that only educated immigrants would benefit the U.S. economy. Just as policymakers excluded “unskilled” and “illiterate” immigrants from participating in the national narrative in 1917 through the implementation of illiteracy tests, Merisotis and Lofgren reserved access to the American identity for only educated, skilled undocumented immigrants.318 Using classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism, policymakers framed skilled undocumented immigrant youth as integral parts of the capitalist machine rather than as humans who deserve equal access to economic and social privilege. As Foucault reminds us, a primary way in which the state preserves its position of power is to render its people objects of its control. He argues that the state views the body as a “docile that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” for the purpose of stripping it of its individual force of power and transforming it into an “aptitude” or “capacity” of the state.319 Labeling immigrants as “human capital” reinforces their powerless position as docile and utilitarian objects, reducing immigrants to economic pawns needed to uphold the power of the state. Thus, the rhetorical strategy of framing undocumented immigrant youth as economic contributors fails to challenge the economic, racial, and social hierarchies of power and severely limits the passage of future policy benefiting the economic status of all marginalized immigrants, especially those immigrants furthest away from the status quo.320 Not only did the use of assimilationist and classist discourses fail to contest the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism, this strategy also restricted the ability for immigrants to resist mechanisms of state control. In the 2007 hearing, supporters of the DREAM Act utilized discourses of fear to highlight the injustices of detaining and deporting undocumented youth. They described the pain and anxiety resulting from the fear of deportation and family separation, making known the experiences of those living in the shadows cast by restrictive immigration policies. However, these panelists had previously stated their desire to become staunch members of the same society responsible for their fear; therefore, their testimonies lacked the rhetorical power needed to overturn centuries of state control. The following section investigates the strategic shortcomings of immigrant panelists who used discourses of fear to challenge mechanisms of internal enforcement.

#### US Antitrust isn’t a domestic attitude, it’s an international structure that coerces and condemns other nations into a continual state structural adjustment. Competition bleeds outward and mutates developing nations into a deformed image of Empire that will never be cared for.

Waked 16 (Dina I. Waked, Assistant Professor of Law at Sciences Po Law School, “Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges,” 2016, Journal of Law Economics and Policy, Vol. 12.2)

The unprecedented spread of antitrust laws in the 1990s raises the question of why did developing countries adopt competition laws in the 1990s and not before? Further, why did so many of them suddenly become interested in competition law adoption? There is no simple answer, except to say that competition laws were not considered an important addition to their arsenal of laws up until the 1990s. One reason was that many countries had provisions either in their penal codes, civil codes, or commercial legislations dealing with competition law issues before formally adopting legislation that is solely concerned with competition matters.8 This made them less interested in adopting particular laws dealing with competition, seeing that they had general provisions in other legislation dealing with the same issues. Then why did so many suddenly become interested in these kind of laws in the 1990s? It is simplistic to argue, yet probably true, that many countries were entering trade agreements in the 1990s that made the adoption of competition law a prerequisite to the implementation of the trade deals.9 These treaties were either trade agreements creating free trade zones or part of structural programs that intended to open up the developing world economies and facilitated the entry of foreign entities that considered a competition law a necessity and guarantee for their work abroad, in particularly in a developing country. More generally, the 1990s are considered the era where developing world countries started to put an end to their former protectionist policies that were either inspired by communist or socialist regimes or simply by efforts to industrialize and strengthen national champions and local producers. The 1990s introduced the new era of international trade, encouraging foreign direct investment, and membership in regional trade agreements or the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the emergence of many of these structural changes, open door policies and participation in world trade relations, competition laws were suddenly prescribed as necessities to fa-cilitate much of the impending changes.10 It is important to understand the role played by the WTO and other international organizations in encouraging and often requiring new members to adopt these laws in order to understand the surge in the developing world.11 Similarly, the role played by the EU in encouraging new members and trade partners to adopt competition law is even more straightforward.12 Adopting these laws seemed to many as the missing link to assure growth and development.13 Therefore, one could argue that one of the main factors that led to the widespread adoption of competition laws across developing countries is the push exercised by supranational bodies. Another factor is the overwhelming evidence these international bodies were presenting to developing countries illustrating a positive relationship between adopting a competition law and development. Competition laws appeared to be the missing link needed to usher in prosperity and growth. The pressure by international bodies and the development hopes that adopting competition laws carried are discussed in more detail next. A. The Push by International Bodies to Adopt Competition Laws International and supranational bodies have considered competition laws essential for economic reforms. Ever since competition laws were discussed as part of the agenda of the negotiations to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II, competition laws were considered a vital requirement for needed reforms. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) upheld the rhetoric of the ITO and included competition issues and restrictive business practices in a “best endeavor” clause.14 However, the GATT did not require the adoption of specific provisions dealing with the treatment of private restrictive business practices (RBPs).15 Therefore, the members of the WTO could freely adopt their own national competition laws so long as they did not infringe the principle of nondiscrimination.16 The General Council of the WTO created a Working Group in April 1997 on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. This Working Group strongly called on developing countries to adopt competition rules in the face of the global merger wave underway and the structural changes taking place within the developing countries as a result of their liberalization and free trade policies.17 The WTO's focus on competition law adoption is due to the widely believed interaction between competition policies and the expansion of free trade.18 Effective free trade policies require, next to the withdrawal of trade barriers, the elimination of obstacles originating from private restraints resulting from abuse of dominance, monopolization, import and export cartels, horizontal and vertical restraints, and other issues considered to be competition law violations.19 To achieve these results, the WTO urged developing countries to adopt competition rules, often US or EC type competition policies, while encouraging for time lags in the introduction of these different aspects of competition rules to be able to efficiently implement them. One can explain the WTO’s continuous attempt to influence, encourage, and facilitate the adoption of competition legislation in developing countries by its aspirations towards harmonizing competition laws to one day usher in universal competition policies under its umbrella.20 The WTO is repeatedly encouraging agreements on core antitrust principles as a first step towards the achievement of this goal.21 When developing countries adopt rules similar to those in more developed countries, the attempt at harmonization seems more realistic and at the same time the effects of global anticompetitive conduct with relation to trade can be better tackled. If laws adopted in developing countries were fundamentally different from those in the advanced world, the ability of the developed countries to protect their interests from anti-competitive practices in developing countries would be limited. Thereby, not only would similar competition laws encourage more effective free trade, but would also give a sense of security for FDIs and MNCs working in developed countries. One can also argue that it would give the host developing country more teeth to prosecute prohibitive conduct emanating from local or foreign entities, and to challenge harmful global mergers. The WTO is not alone in encouraging competition law adoption across the developing world. Several international financial institutions consider a competition policy dimension when evaluating country risk necessary for lending purposes.22 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA) look at a country’s competition policy when assessing the situation of borrower countries before deciding to allocate the funds needed.23 A classic example is the case of Indonesia, where the country was required by the IMF to adopt a competition law in return for rescue money.24 It is worth noting that the first conditionality appeared in a World Bank industrial sector adjustment loan to Argentina in 1991.25Also, the United Nations and the OECD played a role in pushing for the adoption of competition laws across developing countries. Both institutions have adopted and promoted non-legally enforceable “codes of conduct” to prevent anticompetitive practices.26 The United Nations has also set up, under the rubric of the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United National Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), several projects and initiatives that assist developing countries in the design and implementation of their competition policies.27 The increased interest of international and supranational bodies with regard to encouraging adoption of competition laws in the developing world originated in the wave of neoliberal reforms as part of the Washington consensus, which resulted in privatization and liberalization across developing countries. Some of the goals of these reforms were to put an end to government monopolies and governmental intervention in the economy through liberalizations and privatizations. However, the result of the wave of privatization was that government monopolies were simply replaced by private monopolies yielding the same anti-competitive effects.28 For the past two decades or more, the World Bank Group and other development organizations have encouraged developing and emerging market economies to adopt pro-competition measures such as trade and investment liberalization, privatization, and economic deregulation. These initiatives have been aimed primarily at reducing public sector policy-based barriers to entry, regulatory costs, and delays that unnecessarily constrain private sector economic activity . . . . They are, however, insufficient— they are complementary to but do not substitute for an effective competition law-policy. They do not address the private sector restrictive business practices that can significantly impede competition. Unchecked, anticompetitive practices by dominant and politically connected firms and vested interest groups can capture or significantly reduce the benefits that accrue from competition . . . . Competition does not arise or sustain itself automatically. The competitive process needs to be maintained, protected, and promoted to strengthen the development of a sound market economy. 29 Similar rhetoric was reproduced over and over, not only by these international organizations, but also by lawyers, economists, and policy makers. The result was that adopting competition rules became a priority on the agenda of economic growth in many less developed countries, who pushed forward with the help or pressure of various supranational institutions. Some countries, however, resisted the push to adopt competition laws and continued to prefer concentration to competition. They, thereby, had less of a drive to adopt competition laws based on their own initiatives. Others felt the need to adopt competition laws and to drive their markets towards the perfect competition ideal. Part of this desire was their belief in the rhetoric presented to them, but also due to the increased cross-border influences of anti-competitive practices,30 especially their import of cartel-affected goods.31 Trading partners have also requested the adoption of antitrust laws as a condition for signing free trade agreements.32 For example, the EU has been extremely active in the process of spreading its competition law to developing countries. This is to the extent where “some argue that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law in the world.”33 Treaties, such as the Accession Agreements signed by Eastern European countries to join the EU34 or the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements signed by various non-European Mediterranean countries and the EU, oblige the signatories to adopt competition laws modeled on Article 101 (formally 81) and 102 (formally 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).35 One of the studies on the adoption competition laws across countries suggests that “the impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union.”36 One reason why the EU has been actively involved in shaping the competition laws of developing countries could be the fact that the EU is an important trading partner and, therefore, it is eager to trade with countries that have similar laws. Another reason could be its race with the US on issues relating to harmonization of competition rules, whereby its influence on the competition laws of developing countries is an attempt to diffuse its laws, which could push the balance in its favor when negotiations on harmonized rules are underway. It is also worth noting that the EU is not the sole entity to require the adoption of competition laws in its bilateral trade agreements with developing countries. Many Free Trade Agreements have endorsed similar requirements, where parties to these agreements are required to have a domestic antitrust regime in place as one of the main conditions before entering into the agreement.37 Other bilateral and regional free trade agreements have also included chapters on competition policy.38 Finally, several nongovernmental organizations have also advocated the adoption of these laws and promoted assistance to countries in their implementation phases.39B. Development Hopes Associated with Adopting Competition Laws Development hopes have been crucial in the spread of competition laws. The direct impact of adopting competition laws on prosperity, economic growth, and development is often the reason furnished by these international institutions for developing countries to adopt these laws. The heightened interest in competition law adoption “suggests competition law is widely seen as a desirable and worthwhile economic policy.”40 Competition policy has often been regarded as a building block of economic development. A paper of the WTO Working Group described that: The specific benefits that have been attributed to such policy include promoting an efficient allocation of resources, preventing/addressing excessive concentration levels and resulting structural rigidities, addressing anti-competitive practices of enterprises . . . enhancing an economy’s ability to attract foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such investment, reinforcing the benefits of privatization and regulatory reform initiating and establishing a focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive reforms and a competition culture.41 The United Nations has also advocated, on many instances, that competition policy is a key ingredient for growth and development of nations.42 The same position has been taken by the OECD. One of its publications based on a survey of OECD members and non-members asserts that: There are strong links between competition policy and numerous basic pillars of economic development. . . . There is persuasive evidence from all over the world confirming that rising levels of competition have been unambiguously associated with increased economic growth, productivity, investment and increased average living standards.43 These kinds of assumptions are often backed by empirical studies showing that adopting competition laws lead to higher competition intensi-ties,44 which is automatically read to mean higher growth levels. The microeconomic fields of industrial organization and endogenous growth present ample material to show how competition is positively associated with growth. For example, one study argued that competition rules help sustain two of the fundamental ingredients of “economic growth: namely competitive markets and a sound legal system.”45 Another study stressed the fact that the adoption of competition policy is “positively correlated with the intensity of competition.”46 A further empirical study using multi-country regression analysis to explore the correlation between competition and growth rates found a “strong correlation between the effectiveness of competition policy and growth.”47 This study also illustrated that the effect of competition on growth is more than that of “trade liberalisation, institutional quality, and a general favourable policy environment.”48 This, however, was found to be predominantly true for Far Eastern countries and less so for other developing countries.49 Other proponents of the relationship between adopting competition laws and development argue that competition rules are a precondition to the implementation of successful privatization, especially if the goal of privatization is not the substitution of government monopolies by private ones.50 Similarly, another study concluded that liberalization alone does not lead to development since “non-tariff barriers to trade will replace tariffs that trade liberalization removes because of the political power of rent-seeking special interest groups.”51 Some also suggest that having competition legislation will deter corruption in transition economies, where “government bodies have tremendous power to affect the competitive process when they issue licenses, permits, franchises, and subsidies.”52 When these economies adopt competition laws some of the powers of government officials might be curbed and their responsiveness to bribes in order to facilitate illicit economic privileges might be reduced. This is assuming that the enforcers of the competition laws will not themselves be susceptible to bribes to avoid antitrust enforcement. Moreover, competition policy is considered essential for developing countries as a tool to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered essential for growth.53 Adopting antitrust laws creates a more transparent framework that increases investors’ reliance on the economy and reduces transaction costs.54 These are only some of the studies testing the relationship between competition law and development. It is important to note that most of the above-mentioned studies either test the correlation between adopting competition laws and development or between a proxy called “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy”55 and development. This is drastically different from studying the relationship between enforcing the competition laws and development. The latter should be the measure used to ascertain whether competition laws lead to development or not. Studying enforcement instead of adoption will not necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Regardless, developing countries have found the promises of development and growth associated with the adoption of competition laws too hard to ignore. International organizations and academic studies presenting the positive relationship between competition laws and development were made readily available to developing countries. The studies have shown persuasive conclusions that developing countries eagerly accepted. At the same time, these nations encountered numerous challenges, some structurally due their own positions as developing countries and some related to the discourse that competition laws lead to development and growth. Both of these challenges are discussed next. III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: CHALLENGES TO ANTITRUST ADOPTION This section addresses some of the recurrent challenges articulated in adopting a competition law. Some of these challenges are due to the idiosyncratic nature of developing countries, yet others are more general critiques to the merits of competition laws. A. Limited Resources Need Not Be Wasted on a Costly Competition Regime Developing countries face numerous challenges with regard to adopting and enforcing competition rules. At the outset, enacting competition legislation was not always considered a priority on their reform agendas. This is due to the high costs and low returns associated with adopting these rules compared to other reform-oriented policies, such as removing trade restrictions. One of the common arguments is that trade liberalization yields far greater prosperity than adopting laws that attack restraints of trade. The advocates of trade liberalization, as a substitute for antitrust, argue that the mere removal of trade obstacles, such as tariffs and barriers to entry, will effectively discipline domestic producers in transition economies.56 They support the notion that “[f]ree trade is, consequently, the best antitrust policy.”57 Also, the argument that “[f]ree trade stimulates wealth creation and development, and in a small country it makes antitrust concerns largely irrelevant,”58 has been made to caution against adoption competition laws. Another argument in favor of trade liberalization is that the limited public resources of transition economies would produce better outcomes if invested in initiatives improving the flow of goods. For example, improvement in infrastructure would give consumers access to an increased number of sellers.59 Similarly, it is argued that economic policy and competition law enforcement divert the scarce resources away from more important priorities on the path to reform and development. The famous quote from one of the fierce opponents to imposing competition laws on transition economies, Paul Godek, is worth noting: “[e]xporting antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly, he will not be able to eat what little there is available to him.”60 B. Plenty of Reforms to Accommodate a Competition Enforcement Apparatus Are Needed Related to the criticism of spending scarce resources on adopting and enforcing competition laws is the claim that developing countries need also acquire, reform, or implement administrative apparatuses, effective judiciary and appeal systems, independent investigating authorities, and expertise.61 Most developing countries lack the aforementioned necessities to enforce antitrust laws. To improve the chances of effective antitrust implementation, developing countries need serious reforms in these areas. These are all costly endeavors that would deplete their resources further. In addition to these challenges, developing countries face further obstacles to competition enforcement due to the lack of data collection, which is especially necessary to define market shares. This is evident by the lack of effective “Statistics Offices” in public administrations that provide this information.62 The weakness of professional associations and consumer groups are also considered challenges that stand in the way of creating awareness and a competition culture that are essential to facilitate the smooth spread and implementation of these laws.63 Given these drawbacks in developing economies, what is ultimately feared is that the enforcement authority to be set up will not be able to apply the competition rules. It will lack the necessary funding, technical staff, and supporting environment to effectively enforce the law. It is also often argued, that in a developing country, an administrative body will often lack the necessary independence that is arguably critical for antitrust enforcement.64 C. Corruption, Government Intervention and Crony Capitalism Hamper Effective Competition Policy One of the critical challenges that face developing countries is the already high level of government interference in the economy, which is by default increased further when a competition law is adopted and enforced. The government intervention includes government-erected barriers to enter or exit the market,65 government monopolies, the various forms of subsidies granted by governments to loss-making enterprises,66 and government politicization of the administrative authorities in force of applying and enforcing the law. In most developing countries, governments play an active role in regulating and setting bureaucratic measures to be followed by firms to enter or exit the market, resulting in many instances in rigid barriers that cannot be surpassed. This in turn leads to rent-seeking behavior, cronyism, corruption, and favoritism.67 Adopting a competition law is arguably adding another layer of bureaucratic red tape that needs to be surpassed for firms to operate effectively. Similarly, this criticism amounts to the fear that competition policy will be a tool to provide disguised government control and hamper the growth of the often-fragile private sector. Developing countries also portray a unique political economy, where often government interests and those of the business elite are one and the same.68 This casts serious doubt on whether competition law enforcement will not be selectively used to create further obstacles to those players that are not part of this favored club. It may only entrench the powers of the incumbent firms and those that pay the highest rewards to the government apparatus.69 It is often argued that developing economies are enmeshed in a “Kafkaesque maze of control”70 where large family owners use their influence to limit competition and obtain finances from the government to alter the game in their favor.71 The poorly functioning capital markets in many developing countries furthers the concentrated ownership of the local elite even more. The fear is that incumbent firms use their rents to pay for such selective and biased enforcement, which can often not be matched by new entrants and small firms who want a piece of the pie.72 Incumbent firms want to maintain the status quo and resist any potential changes that might lower their influence and position in the market.73 Given this political economy “[a]ntitrust policies affected by political considerations may, however, come with a large price tag attached.”74 One of which is that “interest groups will follow their incentives and shift resources into monopolization through government protection. Lobbying the government for protection may be highly substitutable for organizing cartels.”75 In other words, producers and incumbents will now invest their rents in lobbying the government to continue their monopoly positions. Rodriguez and Williams argue that “the gain to interest groups of establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed by simply soliciting preferential treatment from the state.”76 This implies that “antitrust may cause inefficiencies that are worse than the allocative losses that it is designed to defend against.”77 Such bureaucratic capture is assumed to make enforcers not able to serve the public interest.78 Nonetheless, arguments using interest group theory to qualify antitrust enforcement are not without their own critiques.79 Adding high levels of corruption to the mix, it is predictable that empowering the governments in developing countries with a competition law will lead to even more corruption spent to alter the game in the favor of the local elite and friends of the government at the expense of overall welfare. Such political and bureaucratic resistance is arguably among the main problems facing developing countries in terms of implementing their competition laws and creating a competition culture.8

#### Historic use of antitrust was signaled as the “cure-all” for an increasing racialized fear of communism in Asia and the Middle East. From Hayek’s preaching of the “competition ideal” to the amendment of the Clayton Act,[[5]](#footnote-5) antitrust was repurposed for combatting the growing Red and Yellow Scare. Even now, Biden preaches

Biden 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

Let me close with this: Competition works. We know it works. We’ve seen it works when it exists. Fair competition is was what made America the wealthiest, most innovative nation in history. That’s why people come here to invent things and start new businesses. In the competition against China and other nations of the 21st century, let’s show that American democracy and the American people can truly outcompete anyone. Because I know that just given half a chance, the American people will never, ever, ever let their country down. Imagine if we give everyone a full and fair chance. That’s what this is all about. That’s what I’m about to do.

#### This is a new age of Yellow Peril. Paranoia has been sutured to the social and political that ignites Asian violence to fuel American exceptionalism. This establishes a positive feedback loop that proliferates orientalist tropes that conflates Yellow Peril as the pathological death knell to Whiteness.

Svetlicic 20 (Marjan Svetlitic, PhD Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, “From Red Scare to Yellow Peril; Reality and Fears of the Rise of China in a Historical Context,” Teorija in Praksa, Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Science, Vol. LVII, No. 1)

China appears to be the greatest challenge facing the world today. A strategic anxiety, the New China Scare, has surfaced. Such fears, almost rising to phobias, are not new. They have been seen regularly throughout history in various clothes whenever a power transition was underway. In more recent times, such fears started with the red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism. This was followed by European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of reconstruction after WW2. Later, in the late 1950, following the spectacular technological rise of Japan, the Yellow Peril emerged in the USA for the second time. Today we are encountering the third Yellow Peril – even though it originally started already at the mid19th in the USA as a fear of Chinese immigrants. Following 9/11, the obsession with terrorism commenced similarly to earlier anti-communist hysteria in the country. The Trump Administration has now started a trade war with China as part of the inward-looking economic and nationalist policies of America First. An opportunity has been created to replace America’s presence in the global arena as a consequence. It is not by chance that a trade war is brewing at a time when China is celebrating 40 years of being open to the world and becoming a leader in certain technologies. What is really underway is a technology war. After China’s spectacular growth, it is now time for states to begin thinking about what this actually means to each of them, what it means to their region, and to the world generally. Trump’s trade war against China may be seen as a way of rectifying some of the deficiencies of the existing Pax Americana. It is thus high time to reflect on whether China’s growth threatens the world’s development and stability (system) or is benefiting the partner countries. The awareness that China is not only a country with a big economy, but also one that has growing military strength coupled with geo-strategic ambitions, is making a difference in both real life and theory2. World power is obviously going back to Asia. The winners will be those able to take advantage of this (Prestowitz, 2005). According to Porter, “the biggest risk is not that China will succeed in rising to become an economic superpower. The biggest risk is that it will fail” (Porter, 2005). It is hence no surprise that China is increasingly seen as a threat. Paranoia has been carved into mind-sets not only for the country’s size, but also for the different Chinese civilisation which for the Western world is a strange combination of culture, a particular type of state-controlled economy and state socialism/communism. The purpose of this article is therefore to answer two research questions. First, are these fears justifiable or overblown, with concerns being based on the differences in the roots of civilisation, on cultural fears? Second, what are these differences, if any at all, and can we detect any similarities among them? The article is structured as follows. We first look at the theoretical framework of such challenges/fears, then consider each fear in chronological order in sections 2 and 3. The fourth section seeks to identify differences/ similarities while the last sections outlines some policy-related conclusions. Theoretical Framework The article addresses the manner in which views/perceptions3 of different global challenges have evolved in recent history. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates more on qualitative data and attitudes along with the context in which they are created because, as implied by Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, it is appearances and perceptions, not the reality that truly matters. In such qualitative analysis, social psychology is becoming ever more important. It sees challenges as a positive reaction to perceived fear4, regarded as one of the basic emotions. “The culture of fear5 of the other seems to be a forceful mechanism of social and political indoctrination for human beings« (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013). It has played and continues to play a central role in driving popular fears to make the masses do, or not do, what the elite desires. Especially in the twenty-first century, described as uncertain and unpredictable, risky VUCA (vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), we seem to engage ever more frequently with various issues through a narrative of fear as a vital instrument of propaganda or, to borrow Bernays’ expression, engineering of consent (1969). People develop specific fears as a result of what they have learned, but the cause might also be an irrational, unconscious fear of the unknown6. Moreover, individual fears can grow into fears of a whole group or can as well arise from the fears held by a whole group usually manifested as stereotyping erroneously, of an entire nation. When problems mount in society, the specific cultural and historical context involved can fuel the stereotyping of entire nations as people look for the causes of such problems in others, in foreigners. They start to blame (scapegoat) them for job insecurity, problems with healthcare, low wages, the lack of safety nets etc. In a culture of fear, domestic frustrations are transferred to foreign enemies. A crisis is a typical example of when such prejudicial attitudes are created, although stereotypes can also be built to make it easier to process limited information and degrade others in order to magnify one’s own image. This phenomenon is more common when little is known about others or it is hard to learn about them due to being located far away (the distance factor). Such stereotypes impede our ability to objectively assess data/processes, assuming that stereotypes, presenting different picture, are believed to be true. Our readiness and ability to think critically and predict the behaviour of others is thereby weakened. All of these elements are visible in all the perils we analyse here, particularly in the yellow scares. People like to rely on stereotypes that validate their already held opinion more than trying to evaluate each situation on its own, by looking at data. They tend to select information sources that suit their ideological orientation and ignore other sources or contrary opinions. In a way, stereotypes are an instrument of excuses. After defining the role played by fear, we must examine more quantitative data to shed light on what creates such fears. Realism is the leading theory explaining sources of power as it mainly relies on material capabilities and relative economic and military power. Apart from neglecting the role of domestic beliefs, this may be its biggest shortcoming in view of the rising importance of soft power.. According to mainstream realism,7 countries compete with each other as they pursue their national interests in the struggle for power in anarchic international relations. The power of a state depends on what it is actually based on and the ways in which it is exercised. Seeking hegemony is therefore the result because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to acquire power at the expense of rivals. States are concerned with the accumulation of relative power as they will not be content with relative security by relying on other states (see Snyder, 2002). Such offensive realism can thus explain the emerging role of China as it aspires to obtain a more prominent role in international relations. On the other hand, defensive realism can explain the USA as it struggles to retain its current dominance, which is proving more important than increasing its power. To properly understand the rise of China today, it is essential to look beyond realism, to also consider the soft power8 which is growing in importance in a VUCA world. However, the capacity to influence others means possessing resources like population, land, natural resources, economy, armed forces, and political stability (Nye and Welch, 2014). Soft and hard power are not alternatives, but complements. In the words of Melissen, “the wheels of hard power can only function smoothly with the lubricant of soft power” (Ham, 2005). Lacking in soft power, China has started to intensively use soft power to complement its hard power based on six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation (Li and Worm, 2010). The whole story about attitudes to the leading or aspiring global players is about power and its transition. Power transition theory is in fact a version of the power balance theory, a very popular theory of international relations that interprets the causes of conflict (Haas, 1953; Sheehan, 1996; Waltz, 1979). It stems from the hierarchical nature of international relations in which the most powerful countries define the rules of the game. As rival countries acquire power, the chances of war increase (Hillebrand, 2010: 12).9 The old powers’ resistance to the erosion of their position leads us to the second group of theories, the theory of hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory (THS) argues that an asymmetric system10 is probably more stable; if one country dominates, it is a hegemon. The hegemon dominates the rules of the game and with the help of military dominance creates certain public goods in the form of security and economic stability. The erosion of this role can therefore stifle the world system and throw its stability off balance. The smaller the difference in power between the leading and rival states, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Organski, 1989) with the upcoming forces because the incumbent power is unwilling to leave its prime position11; the so-called Thucydides trap12 (Allison, 2017). “But it doesn’t have to be« (ibid. 2017) Allison adds, although Kugler (2006) believes that China’s growing power over the USA is greatly increasing the chances of war in the next few decades. Emmott states “that the USA should not fear falling into a Thucydides trap because the historical analogy of England, Germany and WW2 is dissimilar to East Asia today. Germany overtook Britain in the 1900s, while China will not overtake the US for decades” (Emmott, 2009). According to China’s plans, this could happen upon the 100-year anniversary of their country in 2049. However, China is still far from closing the gap on all sources of power and thus the chances of war are lower. The power transition is not simply a political, geopolitical or economic problem, but a psychological one. The leading nations pride is hurt13 and it therefore attempts to block the emergence of any new power(s). The third group of relevant theories deals with different civilisation models since views are firmly embedded in the culture of the observer. Ethnocentrism is a worldview that regards Western culture and way of thinking as something extraordinary, placing it in the centre of the world14. Other cultures are viewed as different, backward, despotic-undemocratic, sometimes even barbaric or racist. It is assumed that the entire world should be modelled on Western values that are seen as universal, always correct, while others are uncivilised barbarians (see Plummer, 2010: 214). “It is about understanding the ideas and practices of another culture with the criteria of our own” (Giddens, 1997). Eurocentrism has been built on an ethnocentric ideological construct approach, locating Europe in the world’s epicentre. It interprets the history of the world as its own history. One’s identity develops on the basis of difference from others, difference in the degree of rationality; we are rational and others are irrational. The only possible conclusion is – European civilisation is superior. According to Amin, this is the ideology of the modern capitalist world (2009). Mastnak sees in Eurocentrism “a colonialist worldview, an inspiration for the European conquest and subjugation of the world and the justification of that conquest and rule” (Južnič, 2009: 183–184). The recently developed ethno-nationalism, manifested in populism and every country first policies has its roots in such theories. It also gives rise to orientalism as a view of the Middle East and, more broadly, of Eastern civilisations (Said, 1996). The mythology of enemies other than us is attributed to “sub- or inhuman ethnic and racial traits”. It is not about attitudes to individuals, but about a group of people who, as a last resort, have evil purposes attributed to them (conspiracy theory) in the sense of good versus bad. The responsibility for our own problems is shifted over to strangers (the ideology of economic nationalism), often expanding into overt populist-tinged chauvinism/racism and xenophobia. Refugees/migrants are increasingly the scapegoats for the ever worse position of those affected by technical progress and globalization (GLO), together with rising imports from China15. The populist revolt against the enormous upsurge in Chinese exports which, on top of the GLO, is seen as the biggest culprit for the lost jobs and deindustrialisation of the West. Inglehart and Norris contend this revolt is largely based on cultural, not economic factors (see Freund et al. 2017). Trump’s protectionism is also motivated by the incorrect assumption that China is to blame for the large US trade deficit.16 A chronology of fears The Red Scare The very first red scare in the USA came after the Paris Commune of 1871 while the second one followed the October Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It centred on the perceived threat of the American labour movement, anarchist revolution and political radicalism. The Third Red Scare came directly after WW2, fuelled at home by the perception of national or foreign communists infiltrating or subverting American society and, as the external factor, by the Soviet Union’s growing role in the world. A new bogeyman, ‘The Red Menace’, was portrayed as being everywhere. Communists were demonised. The Red Scare reached its peak between 1950 and 1954 during ‘McCarthyism’. The pursuit of allegedly communist infiltrators in American society had begun. Domestic communism was seen an enemy of apocalyptic proportions. When the Soviets developed an atomic bomb, fear levels intensified, just like during the Cuban crisis or when in 1957 the Soviets sent “Lajka” the dog into space on Sputnik 1. American pride was wounded then like it is now, faced with a decline in its global leadership. As a rule, such fears manifest as various conspiracy theories to make them become more tangible and more persuasive from the point of view of their generators. After the transition, Russia’s role in the world has been shrinking. Further, like all autocratic regimes, Russia should eventually transition to a marketdriven democracy (Ikenberry, 2014) meaning that it is less of a concern. Nevertheless, fear of Russia is again on the rise, mainly based on deep distrust and value-based concerns. Putin has spoken of the “offensive mistrust of the West about Russia” (Petrič, 2018: 471). American Challenge; Europe The demolished Europe, wrote J. J. Servain-Schreiber in his bestseller (1967/69), is under threat from the Americans. The USA was pictured as “enslaving” Europe, becoming an economic colony based on massive inflows of American investment funds. He believed that Europe, lagging behind the USA on all fronts (management, technology, research) was in a silent economic war. He spoke of “American attackers” in the form of US multinational companies, about the collapse of Europe. Yet Schreiber did not stop just with describing the situation. He helped revive French nationalism (similar to today’s populist movements). Later, he taught at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, 1984–1995) and became chairman of Le Center Mondial in Paris that promoted the development of computer and information technologies. In 1985, he told President Mitterrand he was resigning because the French government had wanted to procure French equipment for France’s schools instead of buying the computers from an American corporation (see Rubner, 1990: 272). Schreiber’s intellectual honesty and consistency may thus be questioned. To conclude, these fears were also overblown. Yellow Peril I The Yellow Peril has seen two waves in the USA. The First Peril was directed against Chinese workers at the end of the 1880s. Rather than addressing the economic aspect of immigration, in 1882 anti-Asian propaganda encouraged the federal government to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act, making the immigration of Chinese labourers to the USA unlawful and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Although this Act was repealed in 1943, anti-Asian sentiment/propaganda remained strong in the country. Later, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, it was directed at Japanese-Americans, portrayed in ways very similar to the 19th century Chinese immigrants. Yellow Peril propaganda was based on the supposedly lower intelligence or subhuman qualities of Japanese people (see White, 2019). Yellow Peril II; Japan The second wave of the Yellow Peril came in 1960 during the Japanese miracle (10.5% average GDP growth in 1950–1973). Japan’s share of world GDP had risen from 2–3 percent to 10 percent. The Japanese miracle was largely due to the creative imitation of Western technology and introduction of new production methods (lean production). Schreiber (1980) was fascinated by Japan’s automotive industry and automation, robotisation and computer science. This miracle was initially facilitated by the possibility of directing all its resources for development (Japan was not allowed to spend on the army). Second, it was due to the inventiveness and working habits of the Japanese people and the systematic strategic trade and industrial policy. The Japanese began to buy property in Manhattan and acquired American ‘jewels’ (like Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Columbia Pictures or the Pebble Beach Golf Course). It was predicted that Japan might already overtake the USA by GDP pc in 1985. Not surprisingly, Vogel (1979) wrote the book: Japan as Number One. This fear indeed had both economic and cultural roots given that American pride and self-confidence had been dented. The Japanese had taken the lead in sectors previously the cause of American pride (automotive industry). Still, such fears again proved to be overblown since Japan’s yellow miracle was followed by very low growth and then by the lost century. Imitation can obviously be a double-edged sword; those imitated feel threatened, while simultaneously, by wanting to have what the imitated have, the imitators themselves begin to be troubled by doubts and lose their self-respect. The French philosopher Girard says this leads to hostilities and a feeling of being endangered. Yellow Peril III: China’s Contemporary Challenge Today’s yellow peril concerns the big challenge China brings to the whole international system after its spectacular rise in the last 40 years. In less than 30 years, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2001. The first signs of the modern fear of China emerged in December 2004, the last month in which The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) remained in force but was set to expire by the end of the year under a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision. Developed countries soon barricaded themselves off from China and the threat of becoming flooded with its textile products. The challenge with China is underpinned by the size of its economy and by it rivalling the USA as the dominant power. China is already the world’s largest economy in population and trade-volume terms. Nominally, in 2017 China’s GDP amounted to 64 percent of US GDP. In 2014, it overtook the USA in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to become the world’s biggest economy (Bergsten, 2018, 2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China will overtake the US (at 2017 market rates) in 2030 (IMF, 2018). Yet, according to the index of economic strength, China still lags 12.3 percent behind the USA. Still, as early as 2030 it may become the leading economic power, holding an 18% share while that of the USA is projected to fall (1973–2030) from 16.3 percent to 10.2 percent (Subramanian, 2011). These economic indicators should be stressed because there is a strong long-term correlation between economic capability, military power and a country’s position in the global power system. “Therefore, the hegemon (either US or China) will be in a weaker position than before /… /. It should be though remembered that, historically, China’s leading role is a natural position, since China lost its leading position by Britain only in the 19th century, and after the WW2, when US has taken over from the latter” (van Bergeijk, 2018: 15). One of the more controversial economic accusations and economic fears underlying the challenge posed by China is that it systematically imitates17 and ‘steals’ intellectual property (IP)18 and forces foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies. Imitation is partly the result of admiration and resistance to Western ideas following the Century of Humiliation, the “Opium war which marked the beginning of China’s collapse and dismemberment at the hands of foreign powers” (see Davis and Rašković, 2017: 8). A fundamental goal of contemporary Chinese politics is to do all that is needed to ensure this never happens again. It nevertheless seems that this accusation is overblown. Namely, in the latest US-China Business Council Member Survey, just 5 percent of respondents reported having been asked to transfer technology to China, and this concern was ranked 24 out of the top 27 challenges facing foreign companies (Huang and Smith, 2019). At the same time, certain problematic imitation activities (trade, foreign investment, licensing, international research collaboration, reverse engineering) are legitimate and voluntary. Moreover, the situation in the area of IP rights is now changing. Premier Li Keqiang stated that “strengthening IP protection is strategic and vital for strengthening the socialist market economy” (Reuters, 2017). In view of the ambitious plans to transform China from a “large manufacturing country” into a “powerful manufacturing country” by 2025 and a “leading global producer” by 2049 (“Made in China” and plans for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049), it may be expected that China will become a leader in many technology-driven activities. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen the protection of IP not so much due to external pressures but under the internal pressure of its own companies that desire greater protection for their patents. The more domestic firms become innovative, the more they are seeking to protect their IP rights19. China is a global leader in technologies such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech, high-speed trains, renewable energy, and electric cars. Companies like Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, Huawei and Tencent are operating at the global technology frontier (World Bank, 2019: xvii). The third economic fear relates to the huge rise of Chinese investments, especially their acquisition of technology-leading companies (Godement et al., 2017). This opens the door not only to economic but political influence and creates potential for the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ policy. Public opinion is becoming more hostile (Grant and Barysch, 2008) but oscillating between “China saving Europe” and “China taking over Europe” (Shambaugh, 2013). The world fears the transfer of Chinese management patterns or values wherever their companies make investments. Past experience shows evidence of both implications; strong adaptations to local cultures (particularly in industrial countries) but also the imposition of its own management style and working habits (Africa) or a combination of these two strategies, a kind of Yin-Yang cultural approach treating different countries/firms/people differently. The EU is encountering China’s ever more aggressive policy of influencing more flexible and less critical positions in China (market economy status, democracy). The 17+1 initiative is such a strategy that could create splits within the EU, making some members the ‘fifth column’ of China in the EU. It is thus little wonder that alarm bells have started ringing over China’s ability to translate its economic power into attempts to undermine Europe’s unified policy on China. Apart from hard economic data, soft power factors should also be considered. Here, China’s position is still weak despite all the efforts it has been making in public diplomacy recently. Chinese public diplomacy these days is replacing the previous “charm offensive” strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6) aimed at neutralising the “theory of threats” and improving China’s global reputation (Tai-Ting Liu, Tony, 2019: 77). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may also be regarded as an instrument of soft power. Today’s paranoia, in the face of a rapidly growing and increasingly ambitious China, is obviously principally rooted in the enormity of the Chinese economy. Second, a fear of its difference, exotics, is entailed; third, of its leading role in the world and, finally, the fear of economic intelligence, of espionage, as a threat to security. “In the name of national security, America is treating Chinese students and scholars as a new ‘yellow peril’, in a witch-hunt worthy of Senator Joseph McCarthy” (The Economist, 2019, 13 July: 52). The fear of the difference is merging with the fear of potential political interference in the economy via the large share of state-controlled firms20. The biggest distinction is therefore that China is a different civilisation, a communist, centralised and authoritarian state. It has different values and religious beliefs. The challenge brought by Chinese is thus different. Three potential scenarios arise. First, that China’s position will start to be eroded if it becomes unable to cope with the accumulated problems of its own rapid growth and the fact it has not anticipated the accompanying problems21, including all the political challenges, the necessary democratisation of the political system, and providing more human rights in the long run22. China will encounter Rodrik’s trilemma (2011) regarding how to accommodate its three pillars: GLO, sovereignty and democracy23. This scenario entails considerable internal instability and negative implications for world stability, clearly not in the interest of any of us. An international implication of such a stagnant scenario might be China adopting a more aggressive foreign policy aimed at maintaining support at home while ratcheting up repression against any signs of dissent at home. A more likely scenario is that China will take on a leading role in many areas, especially the economy, thereby beginning to change the world’s structure in either the direction of Pax Sinica or a multilateral system with China as one of the leading powers (the third scenario) in a world of cooperation and competition among the great powers. The question is whether China wishes to abolish the capitalist world order or to simply form a nonhegemonic capitalist world order in which it will have more opportunities for development. According to Hočevar (2019, 15), it seems more that “China does not undermine the capitalist world order, but rather tries to challenge the US position in the existing capitalist world order in order to form a non-hegemonistic capitalist world order”. He may be right for now, but the situation could change when China achieves a more hegemonistic position. History shows that power corrupts and aspirations can, along the way, be broadened, such as to shape the world so as to better suit its own (ideological) design (albeit the changes will be gradual). Economic success is namely enhancing China’s self-confidence, courage and opportunities to exercise its interests. It appears obvious that the US hegemony will come to an end, thereby jeopardising the stability of the system in line with the theory of hegemonic stability. The erosion of this role could thus endanger the existing global system’s functioning, throwing its stability off balance. Differences and similarities in the above perils Is there a common denominator to these fears, eclipsing popular apocalyptic literature, about dangerous aliens threatening our world, or are they more idiosyncratic? Both are correct; there are similarities and differences. Four of the most obvious similarities are as follows. The first is the fear of the growing economic size of the challengers while the second is the fear of external threats, of dangerous aliens that endanger our white world mostly because they are different and not so much because they are economically or technologically threatening. Economic concerns have gradually turned into more ideological, cultural, religious, civilisational or even racist fears. They appear as mythology regarding an enemy, someone that threatens us because they are different, which is not ours. The third group relates to the second but is ideologically based (red and yellow scare III) and the last one relates to the changing international context. The first type of fear (growing economic power) primarily relates to the American challenge to Europe after WW2, and today’s China threat also manifested in Trump’s America First policy. The Japanese yellow peril in the 1960/1970s was also economically based, but dissimilar in that the Japanese are culturally different. Among the analysed economic challenges, the biggest quantitative difference is the size and geostrategic role/ambition. Japan’s challenge in the 1970s was confined to economic/technological power (Japan’s GDP was 9 times smaller than that of the USA, whereas China’s GDP today is already 70% of US GDP). The specifics of the Chinese challenge these days, compared to the one posed by Japan, is that such economic strength is ever more combined with military and geostrategic ambitions to become the leading country in the region and (more implicitly than explicitly) in the world. The challenge China provides today is quantitatively only comparable to that of the USA when challenging Europe in the aftermath of WW2. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also competed with the USA chiefly in the ideological, military and space technology fields, but was never a serious global economic or commercial contender24. The challenge posed by China is unlike the American, red scare and Japanese challenge. China’s size is unrivalled by Russia or Japan. The Chinese shock has affected those who were already struggling to keep their jobs for other reasons while in Japan’s case US industry was better prepared (the context factor). It is also unlike them because China’s growth is extremely important for the global economy, whereas the relative consequences for the world brought by all other challengers would be significantly weaker. The challenge of China also has a geopolitical dimension in that it is becoming a military force and, in contrast to Japan, it is not an ally. China is the only military and economic rival of the USA and is hence creating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence (Geeraerts, 2013: 6). Based on detailed historical analysis, Subramanian notes that China’s dominance is more imminent than usually believed, will be more broadly based (covering wealth, trade, external finance, and currency), and could be as large in magnitude in the next 20 years as that of the UK in the halcyon days of the Empire or of the USA in the aftermath of World War II (2011: 4). Yet, the ‘China challenge’ has some similarities with the red one. They both used to have not only economic but also ideological roots, although the Soviet Union wanted to export socialism and China is expanding more through its economic and less through its ideological power. The second group refers to culturally-based, ideological fears, the threat of those who are exotic, because we do not know or understand them and they are ideologically different. We therefore feel threatened (USSR/Russia and China). In 1993, P. Kennedy stated that “Protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, blocking new technologies, and finding new enemies to replace Cold War foes are common reactions at a time of jolts and jars and smashes in the social life of humanity”, a view that can be applied to the current situation. Fear of this group can also be explained theoretically by the hegemonic stability and power transition theory, and eurocentrism. The third group of differences is political/ideological. While the USA, Japan and Europe share Western democratic values, China is an authoritarian socialist state, just like the Soviet Union was when it challenged the USA. However, China does not export its ideology as much as the Soviet Union did, but is first and foremost pursuing its global economic interests. By doing so, it can also indirectly pursue its ideology by spreading its soft power25 and ‘sharp power’26; for instance, by making the beneficiary states in the BRI financially dependent when they are unable to repay the large loans received for infrastructural projects within this framework (debt trap diplomacy)27. The fourth distinct factor is the changed circumstances in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and, up until recently, the strengthening of multilateralism, galloping globalisation (and de-globalisation of late), growing interdependencies and digitalisation. This is a special kind oligopolistic multilateralism, a blend of cooperation and competition between the major players that today are highly interconnected within a network of global cooperation. This power transition is occurring in a different environment, suggesting that a new cold war scenario is not very likely. Apart from the differences in all of the mentioned challenges, there are some similarities. Basically, all of the said fears: a. were based on quantitative/size factors, the rapid growth of the economies, their political and military power challenging the current system and the world hegemony, b. proved to be overblown, too dramatic, provoking paranoid panic overreactions. But nothing gets eaten as hot as it gets cooked, c. were based on ideological cultural roots, including racial, even racist prejudices28, on ethnocentrism, generating suspicions leading to eroded trust, d. were often misused for internal political battles (McCarthyism in the USA or today’s populism) and draw attention to the need to make changes in the global system’s structure and functioning and to adapt to such tectonic movements in advance, not after the event, to the transition of power underway in the global system. These fears have also caused a rethinking of certain theoretical postulates about international trade/ relations and development theories generally. This is the positive role of such fears. China is clearly the biggest challenge in the modern world. Yet, fears of a yellow peril are not new, although the forms and contexts are different, confirming Hegel when he said that history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy29 and the second time as a farce30 (Marx’s addition). These phenomena started with a red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism and later the Soviet Union (now Russia) after World War II and European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of its post WW2 reconstruction and later the fear of Japan’s spectacular technological rise. The article has described the substantial differences and similarities that exist among the challengers due to their size, political systems, ideological basis, military strength and geopolitical ambitions, and the context. The explanatory power of the different theories varies according to individual challengers; somewhere along the line, the greatest weight was given to the realist school and power transition theory based on economic/quantitative factors as a basis for their power (Japan, USA, China), or ideological/ military factors (in the case of the Soviet Union/Russia), while elsewhere they are again more ethnocentric (Japan, China). This makes a multidisciplinary approach essential because a single discipline is unable to explain such tectonic changes and ensuing reactions. All of the mentioned fears were significantly overblown by linearly extrapolating tendencies into the future, without taking account of the historical context or other factors that hampered such linear forecasts. They were conceptualised within a ‘zero-sum’ game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another, causing inevitable conflict with the leading one and amounting to a challenge and threat to the traditional Western-led international order. Kupchan also seems right when claiming, »that the ability of great powers to impose their preferences will only decline further in the future.… The twenty-first century will not be America’s, China’s, Asia’s, or anyone else’s. It will belong to no one«. The USA will no longer be the hegemon it once was. The transformed international system should, using Rodrik words, leave greater “policy space” for national policies and sovereignty. If the great powers act wisely, neither Pax China nor Chimerica or G2 will emerge, but a multilaterally governed world in the interest of all, not just a few. This is viable if China follows, as proposed by Colonel Liu Mingfu, the example of the USA after the experience of the UK which quietly left the lead role to the USA after WW2, and not the Soviet Union example which directly clashed with the USA during the Cold War. He advocates a tolerant, long-term strategy, a century marathon31 (see Miller, 2018). In this manner, war can be side-stepped and a new model of great-power relations developed, avoiding confrontation with the USA. It seems the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to substitute the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future. However, it holds the potential to influence countries’ development strategies. The near future will not be the same as the last century with one country leading. There could be power sharing between China, the USA, Europe/EU32 and Russia (perhaps also India) within the spirit of a ‘collaborative autonomy’ logic. Europe is not militarily strong enough but has an advantage in terms of its soft power. According to B. Emmott (2006), while China is likely to emerge as the most powerful player, it will not be sufficiently powerful to dominate but strong enough to be significant shaper of the world order. He compares China with Britain in the early 19th century when despite being more powerful it was unable to dominate. It remains unclear whether China wants superpower status. It seems that China is aware of the danger of a strategic overstretch (paraphrasing Kennedy, 1987), as an imbalance between its strategic commitments and its economic base, although it is not immune from triumphalism after abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach of making China great again.

#### The debate community avoids discussing Anti-Asian racism like the plague…

#### Asian debaters are expected to assume a restrained and calm ethos in round because their emotions are pathologized. When docility is expected, deviant behavior gets marked as too aggressive or unprofessional.

#### China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item.

#### Thus, vote neg for the affirmation of transnational Asian praxis. Movements are growing and connecting at a greater rate than ever for anticolonial futures. The conglomeration of COVID, accelerating racial violence, and economic inequality put us in a unique position to break away from norms that have brought us to this present crisis. The only question is if you’re willing to not fear contamination by reaching out and grasping for a new and better future in this round.

Liu 20 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Internationalism Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity,” 2020, UC Santa Barbara Journal of Transnational American Studies)

In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fast growing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

### 2

#### CP Text: Jach’a marka mink’ai echay qanqa di istadus unidus.

#### It solves

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### 3

#### Colonialism necessitates genocide and symbolic death as war becomes a permanent relation

Harting 6 – Associate Professor of English at the University of Montreal (Heike, “Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies,” from the Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar)

The Necropolitics of Global Civil War As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war. In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death. According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence. Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and Negri, then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars. In other words, if imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus, the native is included in the imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped of social life and transformed into bare life, ready to be commodified on slavery's auction blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of bare life derives from his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between "fact and law" (ibid., 171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes the place of politics and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing biopolitics and the normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and preemptive strikes, it also suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is to what extent the production of bare life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies, citizenship, and the concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its politics in ways slightly different from those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ??? then and today, as Rwanda's race-based genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed" (Agamben 1998, 114), that is as homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the value of human life on grounds of race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing process rooted within the necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes the remaking of the human into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them to what Orlando Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves the making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998, 161). In this sense, imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence characteristic of global civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the globe's population. Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather, emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent "war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the "degradation" of the "postcolonial subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the human per se. We may therefore say that if global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred to as a process of zombification. Understood as sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ??? refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-objective violence ??? that is, the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid., 25) and detachment by those who manage and administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven value historically and presently assigned to human life and the politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global warfare. The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's Ghost" Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of exception and the failure of global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and violent excesses. While the novel presents an extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the operative modes of violence beyond their historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by treating it as a normative element of human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project of dramatizing the complicity between religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I argue, unwittingly coincides with normative narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global life as a permanent state of exception. Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6 To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice. If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global war

s. Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence. Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956). Cont For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war. First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring. Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances. Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war? Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.

#### “Extinction” operates as a narrative trope that disavows settler colonialism – rational appeals to geopolitical conflict inscribes social death through appeals to white vulnerability

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(Hamish, Assistant Professor of World Literature at Daemen College, Amherst,“The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, accessed 11-15-16 //Bosley)

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending–the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out–is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states–namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights–and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler-colonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past–about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap–which is at once geographical, historical, and existential–has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from evermoving on from the moment of colonization.2As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies. Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise–but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools–the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change–an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler-colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’–by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms–and ‘fatal impact’–which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak–all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinctional so appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonial-ism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. [...] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones.[...] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth-century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’.11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moseshave traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability–an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change.

#### Vote neg to reject logics of self-preservation that make decolonization unthinkable

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I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper **I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization**. I use this phrase **to invoke**, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat **decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do**, is necessarily **to preclude radical change, creating** opportunities for settler **‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality**.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspec tive is offered by **Veracini**, who **suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can** be found that **make decolonization think- able**.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist? I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinc- tion narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, bio- logically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the puta- tive de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that **extinction is a** core **trope through which settler futurity emerges**, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings. Settler-colonial extinction narratives take two broad forms, depending on whether the end they depict is framed in historical-civilizational or biological terms (though the two overlap). The latter type is my primary focus in this article, but I will first briefly consider the former to provide contrast for the biologically inflected narrative. Historical-civiliza- tional visions of the end of settler colonialism invoke classical notions of the rise and fall of societies, plotting the white world’s development within a cyclical temporality that makes inevitable its eventual demise. Such narratives challenge the faith in progress found in stadial theories of development (such as those promulgated by Scottish Enlight- enment figures like Adam Ferguson16) and draw instead on parallels between the fate of modern and classical empires. Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire becomes a model not only of the past, but also the future. The passage from Schreiner’s African Farm cited above belongs within this tradition, offering a vision of an empty, in different land (‘the stones will lie on’) populated by waves of humans (the ‘yellow face[d]’ Bushmen; the Boers; the English), each of which gives way to the other until a future in which none are left. J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), published at the height of the struggle against white domination in South Africa, makes this narrative even more explicit. With a title drawn from the neo-classicist poet C.P. Cafavy that invokes the late-Roman parallel,17 Coetzee allegorizes apartheid South Africa as ‘the Empire’, a dying institution that can neither protect its own borders from ‘barbarian’ encroachment nor maintain the veneer of ideological consistency that would justify its violence. As the novel’s protagonist, the Magistrate, contemplates his society’s demise, he comes to realise how the problem of ends is intrinsic to the temporality of settler colonialism: What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like chil- dren? It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.18 Within this temporality, the future can be glimpsed in the past, as a repetition of previous cycles of destruction and supersession, more or less deferred. The Magistrate thus finds evidence for his fate in archaeology, when he uncovers remnants of a lost civilization that both predates his own and portends its future: ‘Perhaps ten feet below the floor lie the ruins of another fort, razed by the barbarians, peopled with the bones of folk who thought they would find safety behind high walls.’19 As this example implies, historical-civilizational extinction narratives express ambiva- lence about endings that emerges from their affective register. **Extinction becomes** a fate to be **contemplated with fear**, but also resignation; **because the future is** a recapitula- tion of **the past**, the tone is elegiac rather than apocalyptic, and death becomes a matter of nostalgia more than terror. In Nadine Gordimer’s July’s People (1981), the white family that flees the collapse of apartheid understands its journey into black-dominated rural South Africa as a repeat of the interminable pattern of African history: they follow one of ‘hun- dreds of tracks used since ancient migrations (never ended; her family’s was the latest)’.20 This return to primordial nomadism thrusts Gordimer’s characters into circum- stances of material and agential deprivation, returning them to a condition preceding their accession to racial privilege. They must give up not only the physical comforts accorded by apartheid, but also the capacity to make meaningful decisions about their fate – decisions now made by their erstwhile black servant-turned-protector. This inversion allows the white protagonist Maureen to approach an understanding of how apartheid might have been experienced by its victims; she achieves some insight when she realizes that the historical rupture means she is no longer ‘in possession of any part of her life’.21 From this point of view, the overthrow of settler colonialism becomes an opportunity for settlers’ moral regeneration and subjective transformation. Since history is cyclical, the guilt and inauthenticity generated by settler colonialism becomes incidental to whiteness – once the structures that enshrined his or her control are destroyed, the settler is liberated into a no longer ethically compromised identity. Thus even as Coetzee’s Magistrate finds it ‘as hard as ever to believe that the end is near’,22 he also relishes with ‘elation’ the idea that, were he no longer part of the apparatus of empire, he would be a ‘free man’ who had attained ‘salvation’.23 Historical-civilizational **narratives of extinction** thereby literally **enact** what Tuck and Yang call **a ‘move to innocence’**. By looking beyond the end of settler colonialism, **they imagine futures** in **which ‘settler guilt** and complicity’ **will be washed away**, and **the settler** him- or herself **will metamorphose into** **a liberated subject**ivity.24Many settler-colonial narratives operate purely within this historical-civilizational regis- ter. However, extinction becomes truly interesting when the metaphor’s biological impli- cations are unlocked. Hints of this can be found in Waiting for the Barbarians. While the Magistrate sees the overthrow of empire as an inevitable expression of the cyclical nature of history, he also finds society’s fate written in local ecology. The ‘barbarians’ are materially impoverished but live lightly on the land; the settlers’ wealth, by contrast, is predicated on an agriculture that is unsustainable in the long term: Every year the lake-water becomes a little more salty. [...] The barbarians know this fact. At this very moment they are saying to themselves, ‘Be patient, one of these days their crops will start withering from the salt, they will not be able to feed themselves, they will have to go.’ That is what they are thinking. That they will outlast us.25 Thus the historical-civilizational pattern of rise and fall – which amounts to a theory of world history that explains and to some extent exonerates settler colonialism – is reinforced by an environmental narrative of decay. The settlers will lose, eventually, because their mode of production is at odds with nature: a fact that violence can delay but never alter. An even more explicit example of such thinking can be found in Alex Miller’s Journey to the Stone Country (2002), a novel that explores the fate of settler colonialism in contemporary Australia. The story begins when the protagonist, Annabelle, is left by her husband and returns from Melbourne to her place of birth, near Townsville in Northern Queensland. Unlike the cosmopolitan metropolis, here Annabelle finds Australia’s settler-colonial dynamics intrusively apparent: ‘Here the past could not be ignored, was not covered over and obscured by the accretions of city life, but was laid bare, the open wounds still visible.’26 The land itself reveals these signs, marks made by the Indigenous Australians who are ‘a scattered population [that] had been dispersed and murdered long ago’.27 **That visibility forces Annabelle to confront her identity as a settler, one whose existence is predicted on dispossession and for whom it would therefore be legitimate ‘to be hated [... f]or what we’ve stolen from them’.28** In **confront**ing **the truth of** frontier **genocide**, Annabelle has **to** consider the possibility of an **end to settler dominion**, for she has arrived at a moment when the Indigenous population is resurgent. The change in power relations is represented through a struggle for control of Ranna Station, a pastoral estate owned for five generations by the Biggs family – archetypal colonial settlers committed to the idea of themselves as builders of white civilization – but which has recently been bought by a consortium of Aboriginal groups. In other words, Annabelle is witnessing a historical reversal, the moment at which settler power is broken and control of the land reverts to its Indigenous inhabitants. Miller frames this ‘unimaginable revolution’ in ‘the great wheel of history’29 within the language of biological extinction, inverting its typical application to a presumed Aboriginal past by making it a prophecy of the settlers’ future. Thus Bo Rennie, an Aboriginal surveyor who becomes Annabelle’s lover, gleefully repurposes the language of settler triumph to describe the Biggs clan as having ‘died out’ – ‘Them Biggs turned out to be a vanishing race’, he observes on several occasions.30 The Aboriginal leader Les Marra is even more ambitious. His plan is to dam the valley and flood Ranna Station, obliterating all traces of settler presence and, in so doing, creating an exploitable water resource to fund future projects of Aboriginal enhancement. Marra’s goal is a ‘thousand year plan’ of anti- colonial resistance predicated on the belief that all Aboriginal people have to do to defeat the settlers is to wait for them to die out: This story’s not over yet. The old people not finished yet! That Les Marra and my Arner here, they gonna fight this war for another thousand years. Where’s the white feller gonna be in a thousand years? He’s the one gotta worry about that, not us. We still gonna be here.31 The thousand-year plan (with its ironic invocation of Hitler’s millennium of Aryan supremacy) frames settler colonialism within the radically extended temporality of ecological survival. From this perspective, the material aspects of settler domination are of little importance when compared to the enduring nature of biological life – to which Aboriginal people, by virtue of their 50,000 plus years of residence in Australia, are presumed to be better adapted. **This ‘biological’ view of** inevitable white **extinction forces Annabelle to confront**, for the first time, **the full implications of the end of settler colonialism**: She knew, with a little shock of dismay, with a feeling of personal affront, that Les Marra’s vision of the future would never be reconciled to her existence or to the decency of her own past, the lives of her parents and grandparents. Her existence, indeed, was of no conse- quence to him. There could be no place for her, or for her kind, in the victory he envisaged. Secretly she hoped Les Marra’s crusade would fail, but she knew it would not fail. For Les Marra had only to persist. He had forever. There was no time limit to his strategy.32 The trope of **extinction** thereby **challenges the** liberal **belief in ‘reconciliation’ as a way out of the structural conflict between settlers and Aborigines**.33 Annabelle is in many ways a model settler: she is normatively antiracist, respectful of Aboriginal ways, and self-aware about how she has benefitted from colonialism. But the biological connotations of extinction render such moral-affective qualities irrelevant. The narrative Miller sets in motion frames settler colonialism as an unequal social relationship taking place over the longue durée, within a material, ecologically defined context. From this point of view, individual settlers’ desires and beliefs mean nothing; what matters is that settler colonialism is doomed to fail because it is not attuned to nature. This shift to the extended temporalities of biology/ecology can be seen also in Coetzee’s more recent engagement with the end of apartheid. Disgrace (1999), like Journey to the Stone Country, focuses on a cross-racial exchange of property rights and power. The white protagonist David Lurie’s daughter, Lucy, is a small-scale farmer in the Eastern Cape Province. Post-apartheid changes to agricultural laws allow her former employee, Petrus, to take possession of a slice of ‘her’ land, and the novel charts the progressive shift in power between them – with the collapse of white dominance marked violently when Lucy is raped by three black strangers. By the end of the novel, settler colonialism is locally finished; Lucy’s only hope for survival is to subordinate herself to the patriarchal order of Petrus’ household, accepting his authority in exchange for protection. As with the earlier examples, Lucy sees this move as redemptive, a way of making amends for apartheid and thereby opening the possibility that she might be able to persist into an altered, decolonized future: I agree it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights.34 Yet when Lurie contemplates the fact of her pregnancy he recasts this transformation in biological terms, making it an end rather than the ‘start’ of anything new, foreclosing any hope for redemption: So: once she was only a little tadpole in her mother’s body, and now here she is, solid in her existence, more solid than he has ever been. With luck she will last a long time, long beyond him. When he is dead she will, with luck, still be here doing her ordinary tasks among the flow- erbeds. And from within her will have issued another existence, that with luck will be just as solid, just as long-lasting. So it will go on, a line of existences in which his share, his gift, will grow inexorably less and less, till it may as well be forgotten.35 The unspoken racial undertone – for Lucy’s pregnancy is a result of her rape – turns this passage into a consideration of the death of settler society. Lurie’s ‘share’ or ‘gift’ is not only his familial or cultural contribution to his grandchild, but also his genetic legacy. What will fade over generations is whiteness itself, that politically privileged phenotype that, with the death of colonialism, now has no future but to dissipate in a sea of black genes. Petrus, like Les Marra, ‘has a vision of the future in which people like Lucy have no place’,36 and the novel offers no reason to believe he is wrong. She may linger for a generation, but the end of whiteness is unavoidable; biology guarantees it; all that is needed is time. The ‘line of existences’ in Disgrace thus parallels the ‘thousand year plan’ of Journey to the Stone Country in suggesting the inevitability of white extinction and the irrelevance of white hopes for redemption. Both novels differ from white supremacist paranoia37 in approaching the end elegiacally; the death of settler colonialism is, from this perspective, desirable, even if the some of the losses it entails are regrettable. The former example, however, reveals what was only implicit in the latter: the extent to which this extinction narrative is gendered. Lurie’s vision of his own ‘gift’ fading away contains an implicitly patriarchal subtext. As much as he recognizes his daughter’s ‘solid [...] existence’, his reverie transforms her into a conduit for racial identities that are implicitly masculine. Lucy’s body becomes the passive medium through which white and black men struggle for biological dominance. This theme is reinforced by Disgrace’s parallel plotline, which features Lurie sexually abusing a young ‘coloured’ student of his – a crime that he later recognizes is wrong not only ethically but also biologically, for ‘If the old men hog the young women, what will be the future of the species?’38 The biologically inflected extinc- tion narrative thus brings with it normative conceptions of masculine and feminine iden- tity derived from supposedly innate reproductive roles, in which women are implicitly marked as lacking agency or significance except as repositories for (white or black) sperm. Women are asked to subordinate themselves to the task of transitioning out of settler colonialism, and are invited to acquiesce to a patriarchal order newly re-legitimated by the biological imperatives of racial revolution. The examples analysed to this point have been drawn from two Anglophone settler colo- nies – South Africa and Australia. To take this further I now turn to a third settler society, likewise a former part of the British Empire: Canada. This section explores how the themes laid out above shape Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013), one of the most sustained and interesting contemporary instances of extinction literature. Atwood’s novels, Oryx and Crake (2003), Year of the Flood (2009) and Maddaddam (2013) differ from the texts above in making the biological/ecological dimensions of extinction central and literal. What Atwood depicts is not a metaphorical prospect (races are not species and so cannot go extinct per se) but rather a post-apocalyptic future in which humanity as a whole teeters on the brink of actual oblivion. These texts have typically been read less in terms of postcolonial theory than as a contribution to the emergent sub- genre of ‘climate change fiction’ or CliFi, for which the issue of ‘species survival’ is of press- ing concern.39 I argue that Atwood’s trilogy can be read interestingly when its eco-critical and settler-colonial concerns are seen as intertwined. I suggest that as much as she is intent to explore the environmental consequences of climate change, biotechnology, and capitalist authoritarianism, Atwood is also seeking to imagine a future beyond settler colonialism – and that in so doing, she sheds light on the ideological tensions of extinction as outlined thus far. The opening novel of the trilogy, Oryx and Crake, offers a vision of a post-apocalyptic world that repeats, uncannily, imperial fantasies of settlement. The protagonist, alter- nately named Jimmy and Snowman to signify his pre- and post-apocalypse identities, witnesses ‘the end of a species’40 when a genetically engineered virus wipes out human- ity, leaving him (he believes) the last person alive. In describing his position, Atwood invokes the figure of the archetypal lone settler, Robinson Crusoe. Like Crusoe, Snowman sees himself as ‘a castaway’, forced to improvise a home in an environment stripped of technological and social support.41 The position is analogous, in Snowman’s view, to that of ‘European colonials running plantations of one kind or another’, in that he and they are faced with the challenge of maintaining ‘sanity’ in a lonely and clima- tically alienating environment.42 The role of ‘native’ within this metaphor is filled by the ‘Crakers’, a bioengineered species designed by Jimmy’s old friend Crake as a superior replacement for the humans he exterminates. Snowman explicitly likens the Crakers to ‘indigenous peoples’43 and, in keeping with imperial stereotypes of the native as cul- tureless yet attuned with nature (an idea partly invoked by Journey to the Stone Country), the Crakers’ capacity for survival lies in their biological conformity to environmental demands: They were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would never need to create houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They would have no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money.44 Oryx and Crake thereby stages extinction as an inversion and reversal of the settler-colonial myth of origins. Instead of the settler penetrating, disrupting and eventually supplanting indigenous society, here Snowman’s role is to witness the breakdown of industrial coloni- alism and its replacement with a more idyllic, ‘natural’ (yet bioengineered) mode of being. This inversion alters the flow of racialized time, so that whiteness no longer represents the future towards which humanity progresses but an anachronistic throwback that has already been transcended. As Snowman acknowledges, ‘I’m your past [...]. I’m your ances- tor, come from the land of the dead. Now I’m lost, I can’t get back, I’m stranded here, I’m all alone.’45 Jimmy chooses his new name to reflect his status as the last, vulnerable represen- tative of a dying species: Maybe he’s not the Abominable Snowman at all. Maybe he’s the other kind of snowman, the grinning dope set up as a joke and pushed down as entertainment, his pebble smile and carrot nose an invitation to mockery and abuse. Maybe that’s the real him, the last Homo sapiens – a white illusion of a man, here today, gone tomorrow, so easily shoved over, left to melt in the sun, getting thinner and thinner until he liquefies and trickles away altogether.46 In this way, Atwood shapes her climate-change narrative according to the ‘palindrome’ structure that Veracini identifies in the archetypal settlement myth.47 Instead of centring on a moment of colonial irruption from which the future unfolds as a recapitulation of the metropolitan past, Atwood’s version makes the moment of decolonization its pivot; her future is a landscape stripped of the settler (the ‘white illusion of a man’) and restored to beings who metaphorically, if not literally, arise from the precolonial imaginary. As the last settler, Snowman’s role is not to dominate or destroy the Crakers, but to protect them. In fact, one of the climactic moments of the novel occurs when he adopts the classical settler-colonial role of Moses,48 and leads his charges from the labora- tory in which they were created to the relative safety of empty territory. The end of settler colonialism thus constitutes the allegorical tenor of a tale of the end of humanity: the death of the species affords the opportunity for white supremacy to be overturned in a process that repeats, and thereby undoes, the founding myths of settlement. This allegorical structure has important consequences for how human subjectivity is constituted vis-à-vis extinction. Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that the emergence of climate change into public awareness alters our ‘historical sensibility’, collapsing the key enlightenment distinction between history and natural science and requiring us to imagine our place in time not via modern categories like class, nation or individual, but through the sublime figure of ‘species’. This latter concept radically extends the temporal scope of meaningful action, and it brings to attention those biological ‘conditions for the existence of life in the human form that have no intrinsic connection to the logics of capi- talist, nationalist, or socialist identities’ – that have, in other words, no significance for his- torical narratives as traditionally composed.49 From this point of view, Atwood’s account of the end of humanity – with its detailed exploration of how the biosphere alters to accom- modate the sudden elimination of its top predator – could be read as a radical attempt to conceive of an Anthropocene post-history. Yet the allegorical equation of biological extinction with the end of settler colonialism has the paradoxical effect of undoing much of that radical charge. For what the allegory does is equate, however tentatively, ‘the human’ – which for Chakrabarty is both ‘a purposeful biological entity’ and a blind ‘geophysical force’ that transcends identity categories50 – with the white settler subject: the master agent of the imperialist narrative of world history. Far from unsettling coloni- alism, Atwood’s narrative sees imperialist ideology re-emerge in the moment of its nega- tion. In attempting to narrate the end of settler colonialism, Oryx and Crake actually restates one of its core premises: that the white settler is the archetypal human. Whiteness is re-normalized as the ground against which human experience is measured, and the mul- tiple ways of being human are erased through a discursive manoeuvre that is just as effec- tive as Crake’s act of biological spring cleaning. This is not the only mechanism through which Atwood’s story invokes, only to subvert, the possibility of an end to settler colonialism. A key theme of her trilogy concerns the role of language in tracking the decline of settler/industrial civilization. Following the tradition of George Orwell, Atwood depicts a future in which language has been co-opted by pol- itical and corporate elites; commercial euphemism blunts the critical capacity of words, making it impossible to imagine, let alone resist, economic and scientific decisions that are destroying the environment. Jimmy charts this decline by compiling lists of ‘old words’, ‘words of a precision and suggestiveness that no longer had a meaningful appli- cation in today’s world’.51 In their place has arisen a jargon of commercial neologism that obfuscates the brutal power dynamics of this authoritarian society. For instance, the private security company that monopolizes violence is called ‘CorpSeCorp’, a name that invokes and obfuscates its triple status as a corporation, a paramilitary corps, and a commercial manufacturer of corpses. In defiance of such language, Jimmy makes a point of reading old books, acting out the quixotic belief that if the ‘the decision- making levels of society’ consider something to be ‘arcane lore’ then he will preserve it, delaying the inevitable by turning the pursuit of ‘the superfluous [into] an end in itself’.52 Jimmy/Snowman thus becomes the precarious repository of a literary culture neg- lected by his civilization, trying to hold onto a language that ‘had lost its solidity’ and ‘become thin, contingent, slippery, a viscid film on which he was sliding around like an eyeball on a plate’.53 From this point of view, Snowman’s impending demise signifies not only the extinction of a species but also the point beyond which the accumulated knowledge of the Anglo- phone world will be lost forever – an idea also found in other extinction narratives. In Journey to the Stone Country, for instance, the association between biological and cultural extinction is represented symbolically. Annabelle discovers an old library in the Biggs homestead, but when she tries to read the books – which include canonical titles by the likes of Thomas Carlyle, thus amounting to a synecdoche for Western civilization – she finds they have been turned to unreadable paste by termites.54 Similarly, in Waiting for the Barbarians the Magistrate is prompted to contemplate his own finitude by his discov- ery that the records of the past Empire he discovers are indecipherable – as his own writing will, he recognizes, inevitably become.55 Extinction thus avows that settler/indus- trial society will be expunged not only from the future, but also the past: with the language of empire forgotten, it will be as though it never happened. As Crake observes, ‘All it takes [...] is the elimination of one generation. One generation of anything. Beetles, trees, microbes, scientists, speakers of French, whatever. Break the link in time between one gen- eration and the next, and it’s game over forever.’56 Radical finitude marks the boundary of the futurist imagination, for, beyond it, the language in which speculation is couched dis- appears, leaving a silence that makes all history meaningless. Yet this emphasis on the role of language produces an irony that again renders extinc- tion ambivalent. The irony is apparent in the passage cited above, in which Jimmy expresses his feeling that language has ‘lost its solidity’. His ‘eyeball’ metaphor is paradoxical insofar as its form belies its apparent content; notwithstanding their supposed inadequacy, Jimmy’s actual words are precise enough to conjure a powerfully concrete and de-familiarising simile that conjoins an abstract conceptualization of words’ inadequacy to the concrete reg- ister of sensory affect (‘viscid film’; ‘an eyeball on a plate’). Atwood’s diagnosis of linguistic collapse thus occurs in a passage that auto-deconstructs, making an assertion (language has lost its expressive capacity) that is belied by rhetorical form (an expressive and highly affecting metaphor). The effect is like a ‘blow to the head’, to use Kafka’s famous description of literature that shakes us from the banality of reified language. This is but one example of the broader irony of Atwood’s project – to explore, through literary fiction, the environ- mental and civilizational consequences of an instrumental modernity that renders litera- ture, and the humanistic values it is presumed to embody, putatively obsolete. That irony signals the point at which Atwood’s trilogy (in keeping with the settler-colo- nial extinction narrative broadly) retreats from its contemplation of finitude. Oryx and Crake’s account of the eclipse of literary culture is matched by its concern with the process of storytelling itself. Crake believed that his post-human species would be biologi- cally self-sufficient, but it soon becomes apparent that they require education as much as their superseded precursors. Thus Snowman takes on the role of catechist, transmuting his knowledge of the human past into a plausible yet palatable story for the Crakers. That story is explicitly reshaped to fit the conventions of myth, eventually amounting to a mythological/religious creation narrative: Crake make the bones of the Children of Crake out of the coral on the beach, and then he made their flesh out of a mango. But the Children of Oryx hatched out of an egg, a giant egg laid by Oryx herself. Actually she laid two eggs: one full of animals and birds and fish, and the other full of words. But the egg full of words hatched first, and the Children of Crake had already been created by then, and they’d eaten up all the words because they were hungry, and so there were no words left over when the second egg hatched out. And that is why the animals can’t talk.57 In this way the end of white/human civilization is averted by its transmutation into a differ- ent narrative register: aspects of the past persist insofar as they can be accommodated within fable. What is lost is what would make the narrative ‘realistic’ – Crake’s megalomania and the contempt for society that leads him to erase rather than reform it – but that is a low price to pay when the reward is the preservation of a culture that had seemed close to slipping away. Indeed, Snowman’s role as storyteller marks the introduction of a new discursive frame- work for the extinction narrative – that of religion, specifically the Judeo-Christian master- narrative of sin and redemption. Religious themes are relatively muted in Oryx and Crake, appearing largely as an ironic allegorical structure against which the horrors of biological annihilation stand out starkly. (For instance, Crake’s bioengineered genocide, which leaves the earth piled with the rotting flesh of its victims, is described by Snowman as ‘The Great Rearrangement’ – a redemptive, loving act in which the god-Crake washes away the sins of ‘the chaos’ to make room for his morally pure post-human favourites.58) The new discur- sive framework becomes the dominant concern of the trilogy’s second novel, The Year of the Flood. This novel adopts the same doubled chronological structure as Oryx and Crake. It traces simultaneously the experiences of two survivors of the pandemic and, through flashbacks, their earlier lives as members of ‘God’s Gardeners’, an apocalyptic cult blending environ- mental anxieties with an anticipation of the end of times drawn from Christian eschatology: A massive die-off of the human race was impending, due to over-population and wickedness, but the Gardeners exempted themselves: they intended to float above the Waterless Flood, with the aid of the food they were stashing away in the hidden storeplaces they called Ararats. As for the flotation devices in which they would ride out this flood, they themselves would be their own Arks, stored with their own collections of inner animals, or at least the names of those animals. Thus they would survive to replenish the Earth.59 As James Belich has pointed out, the biblical phrase cited in the final sentence (Genesis 9:1) belongs to a long tradition of religious justification for settler colonialism, in which the Old Testament in particular becomes a blueprint for the conquest and occupation of ‘empty’ lands.60 In the context of the Maddaddam trilogy, it marks the point at which Atwood retreats from the prospect of a complete end implied by Snowman’s putative status as the final human/settler. Instead, the trilogy becomes increasingly concerned with how humanity can be saved from annihilation. Faith in a divine power is central to that hope. Adam One, the founder of God’s Gardeners, asserts that the ‘strictly materialist view – that we’re an experiment animal protein has been doing on itself – is far too harsh and lonely for most, and leads to nihilism’61 – which is exactly the case for Crake, who strives but fails to eliminate religious consciousness from his created species. Instead, Adam One asserts, ‘we need to push popular sentiment in a biosphere-friendly direction by pointing out the hazards of annoying God by a violation of His trust in our steward- ship’.62 The religious framework introduces a moral distinction between the virtuous and the sinful – a distinction that cannot be applied to the concept of ‘species’, as Chak- rabarty’s argument implies.63 Surviving extinction becomes a privilege accorded to the morally upright few, who are rewarded not only with life, but with dominion over the now-emptied world. A story that started as a biologically inflected account of the end of settler-colonial/industrial society has become, via the introduction of redemption, an account of how some people earn divine title to territory: a settler-colonial narrative par excellence. his transformation of the narrative of endings into its opposite is complete by the tril- ogy’s third novel. Maddaddam takes up where Oryx and Crake and Year of the Flood finish, recounting how a band of survivors comes together to forge a new community in the ruins of the old. In keeping with the retreat from species consciousness, this narrative centres on a core moral distinction: between a decent, peace-minded community made up of good humans, Crakers, and ‘pigoons’ (genetically modified, hyper-intelligent pigs), on the one hand, and a predatory group of ‘Painballers’ (traumatized ex-convicts embodying hyper- masculine aggression), on the other. Thus the human attributes that led to environmental collapse – greed, violence, self-centredness – are abjected onto a marginal subcategory of humans, who are eliminated via extra-judicial execution in the novel’s climax. The alleg- edly peace-loving, inter-species community of survivors that is founded through that abjection is a perfect instantiation of the settler-colonial fantasy: a walled compound in the wilderness, defended by military force, subsisting via agriculture. To reinforce the solidity of that community, Maddaddam enacts a hybridization of humans and post- humans that recapitulates the classical settler desire to merge with indigenous popu- lations. That union is first and foremost genetic: three of the human survivors are impreg- nated by Crakers, giving birth to biologically ambiguous children who are, in the words of a male survivor who helps raise them, ‘the future of the human race’.64 Thus Atwood employs a standard trope of settler-colonial ideology, making sex between colonists and natives the mechanism through which to resolve the paradox of settlement and create a future race with the power of whiteness and the belonging of indigeneity.65 That such a mechanism of escape is gendered goes without saying, for it is on the human women that the risk of cross-species reproduction falls. At the same time, however, Atwood’s hybridization is also cultural. Toby, one of the human survivors, succeeds in teaching a Craker child to read and write, enabling the transmission of historical knowledge to the next generation. Maddaddam’s final chapter presents the novel itself as the product of this cultural transmission, linking the post- apocalyptic future to the past via the mechanism that, for Coetzee and Miller, also signifies the core strength of settler-colonial civilization – literacy: Toby gave warnings about this Book that we wrote. She said that the paper must not get wet, or the Words would melt away and would be heard no longer, and mildew would grow on it, and it would turn black and crumble to nothing. And that another Book should be made, with the same writing as the first one. And each time a person came into the knowledge of the writing, and the paper, and the pen, and the ink, and the reading, that one also was to make the same Book, with the same writing in it. So it would always be there for us to read.66 The death of language that Snowman saw as the ending of humanity – its erasure not only from the future, but also the past – is averted. History is transmuted into scripture, and the species/race is preserved as redemption is interpolated into the narrative of extinction. In this way, these settler-colonial **narratives of extinction begin as** a contemplation of endings and end as **a way for settlers to persist**. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, **the native** **must be** invoked and **disavowed, and** ultimately absorbed **into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing** true belonging and **the possibility of an authentic future** in place. **Veracini**’s description of the settler- colonial historical imagination **thus applies**, in modified but no less appropriate form, **to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include** the perception of **an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement**, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentar- ism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: **it is a fantasy of extinction that** tips over into its opposite and **becomes a method of symbolic preservation**, a technique for delaying the end, **for living on in** the contemplation of **death**.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – **the hope that**, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the **settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living**. In this way, **they make their own redemption**, an extinction that is **an act of self-preservation**, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, **and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical** – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

1. Wen Liu, ““Complicity and Resistance: Asian American Body Politics in Black Lives Matter,” October 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Will Carless, “Proud Boys Saw Wave of Contributions from Chinese Diaspora Before Capital Attack,” January 4, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/04/proud-boys-chinese-americans-community-support-donations/7343111002/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Claire Jean Kim, “For Chinese American Conservatives, Race is a Weapon”, October 8 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/asian-conservatives-affirmative-action/ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cathy Park Hong, “Minor Feelings: An Asian American Reckoning” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement,” December 15, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)